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ABSTRACT
COLOCATED OBJECTS? A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE
INTENTIONALISTS’ SOLUTION TO THE GROUNDING PROBLEM

by

Lu Chen
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014
Under the Supervision of Professor Joshua Spencer

C.S. Sutton (2012) renews the intentionalists’ solution to the grounding problem for
colocationalism by responding to Karen Bennett’s (2004) challenge. This paper aims
to show that Sutton’s revised approach to the grounding problem is still untenable. I
start with a simplistic version of intentionalists’ grounding claim. For this simplistic
version, I argue that the possible alternative intentions can lead to contradiction in
modal properties. Then I introduce Sutton’s more sophisticated attempts to solve the
grounding problem. I contend that, in order to avoid the similar objection to the
simplistic version, Sutton ultimately runs out of resources for a genuine solution.
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0. Introduction
What is the relation between a lump of clay (call it ‘Lumpl’) and the statue it
constitutes (call it ‘Goliath’)? Are they identical? Despite their remarkable similarity
in many aspects, including being situated in the same spatiotemporal region 1, some
philosophers – call them colocationalists – insist that Lumpl and Goliath are distinct
entities, because (1) they have different persistence conditions and modal properties,
namely that Lumpl is squishable (i.e. it can survive being crushed down) while
Goliath is non-squishable, that the statue can survive having a bit cut off while the
lump cannot, etc., and (2) Leibniz’s indiscernibility law requires that two identical
things be indiscernible.
The monists – who hold that there is only one entity in question 2– challenge the
colocationists to explain why Lumpl and Goliath have those different persistence
conditions and modal properties, given that they share the same subatomic structure,
surroundings, etc. This challenge is often called “the grounding problem.” (Burke,
1992) In other words, the grounding problem asks what grounds Lumpl’s
squishability and Goliath’s non-squishability. 3
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Lumpl and Goliath simultaneously come into existence and are destroyed at the same time.
To explain away the apparent modal difference, some monists think that the Goliath/Lumpl thing
really cannot be squishable, because when they spatiotemporally coincide, the statue is the dominant
kind and only the dominant kind is entitled to bestow the properties in question (Burke); some claim
the opposite, that the Goliath/Lumpl thing is really squishable because only the lump counts as genuine
substance; finally, the counterpart theorists take it to be both squishable and non-squishable, depending
on which of its counterparts we are talking about.
There are two possible frameworks for the one-versus-two debate: the first framework regards the lump
and the statue as “enduring objects”, which are “wholly present” at any time during their existence;
within this framework, a monist (e.g. Wasserman) may claim that the lump and the statue are identical
even when they have different temporal properties, i.e. coming into existence or being destroyed at
different times. The other framework regards the lump and the statue as atemporal perduring objects,
which consist of all the temporal parts; within this framework, a monist distinguishes between objects
that have different temporal properties. In this paper, I keep neutral between the two frameworks.
3
Although the grounding problem per se is a general question for both colocationalists and monists,
2
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There are various answers or reactions to the grounding problem on behalf of the
colocationalists. 4 Among them, I will focus on the intentionalists’ approach, which
holds that Lumpl’s squishability and Goliath’s non-squishability are grounded in our
different intentions (i.e. our collective attitudes, conceptions and conventions) towards
them. I aim to argue that the intentionalists’ approach is unsatisfactory due to the
trouble caused by potentially conflicting intentions. To do this, I structure the paper as
follows. In the first section, I will illustrate the notion of the grounding relation and
then present the grounding problem in light of it. In the second section, I will argue
against the naive version of the intentionalists’ solution to the grounding problem. In
the third section, I will articulate a more sophisticated version of intentionalism, held
by C.S. Sutton (2012), and then contend that this version is similarly subject to the
argument against the naive version. Finally, I conclude the intentionalists cannot solve
the grounding problem.

1. The grounding problem
The grounding problem asks what grounds Goliath’s non-squishability and
Lumpl’s squishability. But what exactly is the grounding relation and what features
constrain it? The grounding relation is usually thought to be a kind of non-causal
determination or explanatory relation. It’s widely held to be asymmetric, transitive

the latter clearly have more ease than the former in answering it: the monists could appeal to all the
things that Lumpl and Goliath share, but the colocationalists are deprived of those resources, since the
shared things cannot explain the difference. In other words, while both colocationalists and monists
have to explain why various objects come to have their modal properties or persistence conditions, only
colocationalists have to explain why they come to have their distinct modal properties.
4
The grounding problem stirs a wide range of attitudes from both sides in the debate. Some think there
are satisfactory answers to this challenge (Baker, 1999; Wasserman 2002; Sutton, 2012); some argue
that the inability to supply a positive answer is not fatal for the colocationists and suggest that the
colocationists should insist that properties like squishability /non-squishability are brute (Bennett,
2004); there are still others who argue that the grounding problem is either unclear or cheaply answered
(deRosset, 2011). Among the colocationists who accept the challenge, there is the view claiming that
it’s grounded in that Goliath has parts that Lumpl lacks, such as arms, legs, etc.; there is also the view
claiming it’s grounded in the haecceitic identity properties, namely Goliath is identical to Goliath and
Lumpl is identical to Lumpl; the list goes on.
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and irreflexive. 5 To understand the relation properly, it might be helpful to compare
the grounding relation with the entailment relation.
Entailment relations can be accurately characterized as “Necessarily, if A then B”,
while grounding relations require not only the modal covariance between the relata
but also a deep metaphysical dependency that escapes the modal characterizations.
Two examples can make this clear: first, suppose Socrates and the singleton of
Socrates necessarily go together, we may say that the existence of Socrates entails the
existence of the singleton of Socrates and vice versa; in other words, for Socrates and
his singleton, the entailment relation is symmetric. This, however, does not capture
the asymmetric metaphysical dependency between Socrates and his singleton, which
can be expressed in terms of the grounding relation: Socrates’ existence grounds the
existence of Socrates’ singleton, but not vice versa. Second, mathematical truths are
vacuously entailed by any contingent facts; but we do not wish to say the former are
grounded in the latter since there is no deep dependency relation between
mathematical truths and any contingent facts.
Although the grounding relation is different from the entailment relation, the
latter can be seen as a necessary condition for the former, that is, the grounding
relation requires the strong determination that the entailment relation captures. This
comes from our intuition that the grounding relation is a tight dependency of the
groundee (i.e. the proposition that is grounded) on the grounder (i.e. the proposition
that grounds) and that the grounder should be able to provide an explanation for the
groundee. 6 If a table looks red in one possible world and green in another while
reflecting the same light waves under the same conditions in both worlds, we

5

Some philosophers such as Jenkins and Kit Fine cast doubt on the irreflexivity (and hence the
asymmetry) of the grounding relation.
6
The condition of a good explanation is thought to be that the explanadum could not be otherwise
given the explanan. See Trogdon (2013) for more detailed discussion.
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wouldn’t think the light waved provide a sufficient explanation for the color we
expect the grounder to provide.
Admittedly, if necessitation comes in different degrees, it might be too strong to
claim that the grounding relation entails metaphysical necessitation, i.e. the grounder
necessitates the groundee in every possible world, for the grounder might just
necessitate the groundee in the restricted sense. For instance, it might be argued that
although mental properties are grounded in physical properties, zombies with no
mental properties are possible. However, to further our discussion, we need only rely
on a more limited necessitation. For example, in the zombie case, to exclude the
world in which zombies with no mental properties exist, we shall confine our range of
necessitation to those possible worlds that are nomologically similar to our world. We
could always interpret “necessary” in our discussion as meaning restricted necessity
rather than metaphysical necessity. Now we have the following claim about
grounding:
Necessitation claim:
(A grounds B) → □ (A→B)
The above claim says that a necessary connection holds between actual grounders
and groundees, but since there is little reason to favor actuality in this case, such a
requirement for the grounding relation should apply to all possible pairs of grounder
and groundee. Thus, I want to further propose a strengthened version of the above
claim as follows:
Strengthened Necessitation claim (SN):
□ ((A grounds B) → □ (A→B))
I also want to rule out the view that holds that a certain grounding relation applies
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only to a particular thing (or some particular things) and is not generalizable. In other
words, I want to claim that, in a grounding relation, it is not a particular thing’s
having a certain property but its having that property that grounds its being a certain
way. 7 Such an assumption, while debatable, is at least friendly to our expectation that
an explanation of a certain feature of an individual should be able to explain the same
feature of a different individual. For example, if we assert that the table’s reflection of
certain light waves grounds its being blue, then we should accept that anything that
reflects the same light waves grounds its blueness also. More generally, if x’s having a
property grounds that x is a certain way, then necessarily, if anything has that
property, the same grounding relation obtains for it. We can formalize the idea as
follows:
Generalizability Claim:
(∃x) (Fx grounds Gx) → □ (∀y) (Fy → (Fy grounds Gy)) 8

(While I take generalizability claim to be very plausible, one should be careful
not to confuse it with the claim that if x’s being a certain way is grounded in its
certain property, then everything’s being that way is necessarily grounded in its
possession of that property. The latter claim can be easily refuted by the following
counterexample: the party’s having a spy is grounded in the party’s having Ortcutt the
spy in attendance, but it is not the case that every party’s having a spy is grounded in

7

One way to take issue with this generalizability claim is to be committed to haecceitism and take the
haecceitistic property of a particular thing as grounding its other qualitative properties. While such
position is formally compatible with the generalizability claim, since no two individuals share the same
haecceitistic property, the grounding relation that explains a property of an individual cannot be
generalized to explain similar properties of other individuals after all. However, since the
intentionalists do not seem to explicitly adopt such haecceitistic approach, I take it safe not to discuss
the approach further in this paper (although I would prefer to reject this approach eventually). For more
details about this approach, see deRosset (2011).
8 Note that the grounding relation is a factual relation, i.e. that for all x, ‘Fx grounds Gx’ entails ‘Fx’
and ‘Gx’.
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its having Ortcutt in attendance. 9)
Finally, in the above formulation, I want to grant that it is possible to restrict the
domain of the universal quantifier: for instance, one can interpret the domain as all
artifacts, rather than all entities in the universe. The reason is that the grounding
problem is best characterized in the context of a restricted domain.
Having characterized the notion of the grounding relation and what it entails, let
us go back to the grounding problem. Since it asks what grounds Lumpl’s
squishability and Goliath’s non-squishability, respectively, to answer the grounding
problem is to substitute Φ and Ψ in the following schema with suitable propositions.
1. Φ grounds Goliath’s non-squishability
2. Ψ grounds Lumpl’s squishability.
Because of the generalizability claim, the above task further requires substituting
Φ in the following more general grounding claims:
3.

Necessarily, for all x, if Φ, then Φ grounds x’s squishability.

4.

Necessarily, for all x, if Ψ, then Ψ grounds x’s non-squishability.

Now, before digging into the intentionalists’ position, let’s go through some
imagined answers the colocationists may provide to answer the grounding problem
(using Goliath as the example).
a) Goliath’s subatomic statuewise arrangement grounds Goliath’s nonsquishability.
This answer is inadequate. According to Generalizability, this answer implies that
anything that has the same subatomic statuewise arrangement should be nonsquishable; Lumpl has exactly the same subatomic arrangement, but the

9

The example is mentioned by an anonymous commentator.
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colocationalists want to say Lumpl is squishable, which is a counterexample to the
general implication of this answer. The lesson to draw from the inadequacy of such an
answer is the following: any property that is shared by Goliath and Lumpl cannot
alone ground Goliath’s non-squishability or Lumpl’s squishability.
Some philosophers may attempt to explore some options in its vicinity. For
instance, one may claim that Goliath has arms and legs and ears as parts while Lumpl
only has bits of clay as its parts. According to this view, when we squish Goliath, we
destroy its arms, legs and ears, and since Goliath has those as its part, Goliath is nonsquishable. On the contrary, when we try to squish Lumpl, we do not destroy the bits
of clay, so Lumpl is squishable. But there are a lot of difficulties associated with this
view. For example, as Wasserman (2002) points out, we can ask whether Lumpl and
Goliath share any subatomic parts. If they do, then it is hard to explain why the same
material parts compose an arm in Goliath’s case but not in Lumpl’s case. In other
words, the grounding problem merely recedes to the arm level. On the other hand, if
Goliath and Lumpl do not share any parts, that is, if Goliath has a distinct set of
subatomic particles as its parts, then the colocationists may have to swallow the
incredible claim that rearranging subatomic particles can bring forth the existence of
new fundamental particles. 10
Let’s turn to another kind of answer:
b) Goliath’s having aesthetic value grounds Goliath’s non-squishability.
This answer is also unsatisfactory. Although it manages to distinguish between
Goliath and Lumpl, there is no explanatory relation between aesthetic value and nonsquishability. This can be easily shown by an example such as a piece of avant-garde
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For a more comprehensive refute, see Wasserman (2002).
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artistic work that has aesthetic value but can survive being squished (as part of its
design), or a bad statue that has no aesthetic value but is non-squishable.
A third kind of answer is the following:
c) Goliath’s being a statue grounds Goliath’s non-squishability.
It is not easy to find a counterexample to this answer, especially if we consider
something like non-squishability to be built into the sortal property of being a statue.
But then the statuehood would become the new target of the grounding problem. The
question becomes what grounds Goliath’s being a statue.
It seems to me that many answers (e.g. being badly made, worth money, having
body parts, the surroundings, etc.) will fall into at least one of the three categories that
I list above and will thus be subject to the same objections. One can argue either that
(1) the putative grounding property is the same for Goliath and Lumpl, or (2) it is not
an explanation for the groundee, or that (3) one can respecify the grounding problem
to a new target that is accepted as the ground for the previous one. Such
respecification tends to cause trouble for colocationalists so long as they only have a
limited pool of different properties that are all similarly subject to it, because in order
to ground each of those properties, the colocationalists would be obliged to go
circular in the pool while circularity is prohibited by the transitivity and asymmetry of
the grounding relation. 11
Perhaps one could stop respecification by claiming that some property in the pool
is primitive and thus not subject to respecification. For instance, one may claim that
the fact Goliath has a body while Lumpl hasn’t is primitive; or one may even argue
that modal properties such as squishability and non-squishability are primitive, and
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The non-circularity requirement can be shown as follows: If one says (a) A grounds B, (b) B grounds
C, and (c) C grounds A, then by transitivity, (b) and (c) implies (d) B grounds A, which by asymmetry
implies A does not ground B, thus being contradictory to (a).
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hence reject the grounding problem at the very beginning. I will not argue against
such an appeal to primitiveness in this paper. 12 But, I find it intuitively unsatisfactory
to allow modal properties to be basic and brute. Also, modal primitiveness can lead to
unfavorable consequences, such as having to choose between arbitrariness and a
plenitude of colocated objects. (Bennett, 2004)

2. The Naive intentionalists’ view
The simplest intentionalist’s answer to the grounding problem can be expressed
as follows:
C1: Our intention that Goliath is non-squishable grounds Goliath’s nonsquishability.
C2: Our intention that Lumpl is squishable grounds Lumpl’s squishability.
Here, “intention” is used to refer to our collective attitudes, concepts or
conventions; it should be distinguished from the other usage that refers to our private
or personal intentions. So C1 is not about a particular person’s private intention that
Goliath be non-squishable, but more about a convention that Goliath is nonsquishable. I am certainly not saying that a particular person cannot play a decisive
role in specifying the collective intentions; for example, if one invents a Y-shaped
widget as a teaching tool to represent a family tree, her intending this widget to be a
teaching tool can be registered in our collective intention towards this widget. 13 In
other words, the notion of intention here either refers to a collective attitude or one
that is expected to be collectively accepted. This is meant to prevent random and
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It is worth mentioning that some appeals to primitiveness may be less problematic than others. For
example, deRosset proposes that Goliath’s nonsquishability is grounded in its being identical to
Goliath, and that the property of being identical to Goliath is brutal. In this case, some of us may find it
natural to think identity claim as primitive and stop asking what grounds the identity claim.
13
This example is offered in C. S. Sutton’s paper.

10

wishful personal attitudes from affecting the plausibility of the intentionalists'
grounding claims.
According to the generalizability claim, we should be able to generalize C1 and
C2 to the following claim:
The Intentionalists’ Grounding claim (IG):
(IG) Necessarily, for all x, if we intend x to be squishable/non-squishable,
then such intention grounds x’s squishability/non-squishability.
Notice that in (IG) the domain of the universal quantifier differs for different
intentionalist positions, some of which include only artifacts, while others may extend
to organisms. As I mentioned before, I will grant to the intentionalists whatever
domain they like, as long as it addresses a reasonably large group of entities (rather
than, say, a group that just includes Goliath and Lumpl).
It seems that the intentionalists’ view has several virtues in comparison with the
other approaches considered. First, it is not trapped in respecifications of the
grounding problem, because human intentions are usually not thought to be grounded
in their objects but rather in something quite different such as social practices,
neuronal activities, etc. Second, we can have different intentions when facing the
same entity, which provides the potentiality to ground different modal properties – in
this case squishability and non-squishability – that the monists are questioning. Third,
there could be a genuine explanatory or dependence relation between human
intentions and the properties in question. There are conventional properties such as
the property of being worth five thousand dollars, being fashionable, being adorable,
etc., which are clearly dependent on human intentions. If squishability/nonsquishability is like having monetary value, being fashionable or adorable, then
human intentions seem to explain it.
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These virtues make the intentionalists’ view initially attractive to me. However,
the naïve version proposed here does not work. Bennett (2004) has raised a decisive
objection to it. The idea is quite straightforward: the naïve answers (C1) and (C2)
seem to say that our intention merely bestow properties upon Goliath and Lumpl that
exist prior to our intention. Now, are Goliath and Lumpl that exist pre-intentionally
identical? If they are identical, then, since the grounded propositions and the
grounding propositions use the same designators, “Goliath” and “Lumpl” in the
grounded propositions should also refer to identical entities. In this case, the
intentionalists are no longer defending colocationism. If they are not identical, then
the naïve intentionalists allow that there are utterly indistinguishable distinct
colocating entities, which seems highly implausible. So, the naïve intentionalist’s
approach is a non-starter. What I want to do in this section is to raise a different
objection to this position. I want to make it very clear that the main advantage of my
objection is not to knock down this naïve position, since it is already very dead, but to
provide a schematic pitfall that more sophisticated positions should look out for. In
fact, as I will argue in the next section, it is very hard for even a sophisticated position
to find a way out of this.
However, I want to argue that (IG) leads to contradictions unless the
intentionalists reject some generally accepted claims. The idea is roughly this: for a
particular thing q, it is possible for us to intend q to be squishable, and also possible
for us to intend q to be non-squishable. But then the question arises: since our
intention necessarily grounds whether q is squishable, wouldn’t our alternative
intentions lead to contradictions with regards to whether q is squishable or not? I want
to show that the answer is, unfortunately, ‘yes’. The general skeleton of my argument
is as follows:
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Argument against the Intentionalists’ Grounding claim (AIG):
AIG-1: Possibly, we intend q to be squishable.
AIG-2: Possibly, we intend q to be non-squishable.
AIG-3: If (IG) and AIG-1 is true, then q is possibly squishable.
AIG-4: If (IG) and AIG-2 is true, then q is possibly non-squishable.
AIG-5: If q is possibly non-squishable, then q is not possibly squishable.
AIG-6: Therefore, q is possibly squishable and not possibly squishable.
(AIG-1, AIG-2, AIG-3, AIG-4, AIG-5, IG)

⊥

The first two premises AIG-1 and AIG-2 appeal to our familiar understanding of
human intentions. I will give more support to them when addressing and refuting the
intentionalists’ possible ways out of this argument. For now, to establish the argument,
I shall mainly explain why AIG-3, AIG-4 and AIG-5 are true. (Please see Appendix
for a formal version of the justification.)
I will first prove AIG-3 to be true; then, since the proof of AIG-4 is very similar
with the proof of AIG-3, I will skip it and spend time on proving AIG-5.
As a preparation, we need the following:
Modal theorem (MO): □ (A→B) → (◊A→◊B);
Principles of the S5 modal system:S5-1: 00…□ = □;
S5-2: 00…◊ = ◊ (where each 0 is either □ or
◊).
We also need the strengthened necessitation claim:
SN: □ ((A grounds B) → □ (A→B))
From (IG), by universal instantiation, we have that necessarily, if we intend q to
be squishable/non-squishable, then such intention grounds q’s squishability/nonsquishability; together with MO we get: if possibly we intend q to be squishable/non-
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squishable, then possibly such intention grounds q’s squishability/non-squishability;
given AIG-1 (possibly, we intend q to be squishable), we further get that possibly, our
intention that q is squishable grounds q’s squishability. From SN and MO (given S5),
we obtain from the previous statement that necessarily, if we intend q to be
squishable, then q is squishable. Since AIG-1 says that possibly we intend q to be
squishable, one more application of MO gets us the result that possibly, q is
squishable. As such, we have successfully deduced that q is possibly squishable from
AIG-1 and (IG); thus, AIG-3 is justified. A very similar line of reasoning takes us
from AIG-2 and (IG) to the result that q is possibly non-squishable, and thus justifies
AIG-4.
To justify AIG-5, we need some additional maneuver on the modal properties.
Standardly, we analyze squishability as being possibly squished, and nonsquishability as not being possibly squished:
A1: x is squishable =df x is possibly squished.
A2 (follows from A1): x is non-squishable =df x is not possibly squished
For example, in the Goliath/Lumpl case, Goliath’s non-squishablility means that there
is no possible world, in which Goliath is squished and continues to exist; similarly,
Lumpl’s squishablility means that there are some possible worlds, in which Lumpl is
squished and continues to exist. Since we have already got that q is possibly nonsquishable, according to A2, we substitute “non-squishable” with “not possibly
squished” and get the result that q is possibly not possibly squished, which, according
to the definition of modal operators, is equivalent to that q is not necessarily possibly
squished. Now we can use S5-2 to first delete the “necessarily” in the last statement
and then to add “possibly” before “possibly squished”, which results in the new
statement that q is not possibly possibly squished. Given A1, we can substitute
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“squishable” for “possibly squished” in the last statement and obtain the result that q
is not possibly squishable. Now that we have reached the result that q is not possibly
squishable from AIG-2 and (IG), I hold AIG-5 to be justified.
Now we have a clear contradiction as shown in AIG-6, i.e. q is possibly
squishable and not possibly squishable, so there must be something wrong in the
premises. Putting the logical theorems aside, assume the intentionalists want to hold
to their grounding claim (IG), they are left with the following options:
First, the intentionalists can deny the standard analysis of squishability/nonsquishability. If there is a reasonable alternative analysis that is not subject to the AIG
argument, then perhaps the AIG argument amounts to revealing that the intentionalists
have to endorse some non-standard analysis of squishability/non-squishability, which
might be an unfavorable theoretical burden for them if they are not quite willing to
give up the standard analysis. Besides, it’s not clear whether an alternative analysis
can fully resolve the tension that the AIG argument poses. 14
Second, the intentionalists can deny that the grounding relation entails
necessitation. For instance, the intentionalists can appeal to the fact that, in the cases
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Counterfactual analysis of squishability/non-squishability can serve as an example for non-standard
analysis: we can define x’s being squishable at a world, w, as requiring that possible worlds where x is
squished and continues to exist be closer to w than possible worlds where x is squished and does not
continue to exist; similarly, x’s being non-squishable at w means possible worlds where x is squished
and does not exist are closer to w than possible worlds where x is squished and exists. Since the AIG
argument relies on the S5 modal system, which is characterized by models that have its accessibility
relation to be the equivalence relation, the counterfactual analysis might overcome the AIG argument if
we fail to pick out a restricted set of possible worlds whose accessibility relation satisfies an
equivalence relation, esp. transitivity; the accessible relation might not satisfy transitivity in the sense
that when w1 is a nearby world to w2 and w2 is nearby world to w3, it may not be the case that w1 is a
nearby world to w3. However, it’s not obvious to me that the tension posed by the AIG argument could
be fully resolved. Suppose in w1, we intend q to be non-squishable, i.e. w1 is closer to a world (make it
w2) where q is squished and destroyed than a world (make it w3) where q survives crushing down, if
the possible worlds are dense enough, as I expect them to be, then we can always find a set of possible
worlds surrounding w1 that are also closer to w2 than to w3; now let’s interpret necessity as being true
in all those possible worlds, then we can still ask whether it is possible for people to intend q to be
squishable. Admittedly, the answer is not straightforward given that the idea of closeness plays a
significant role here; but I think the intentionalists still have a heavier burden to show that we
necessarily intend q to be non-squishable even in this case. I shall not discuss this topic further in this
paper.
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of mental/physical grounding relations, there are some grounding theorists who want
to grant both that mental properties are grounded in physical properties and that there
can be possible worlds in which some individuals instantiate the physical properties
without instantiating the mental properties (like zombies). But notice that my AIG
argument can be rebuilt on a much weaker necessitation claim. To ensure the
effectiveness of the argument, we need only to rely on an analysis of grounding in
terms of certain restricted necessitation relations, which exclude those possible
worlds that are vastly different from ours, such as the worlds where zombies exist, as
long as within the restricted worlds we are still free to intend differently about q.
Then, I think it would be much more difficult, if not impossible, for the intentionalists
to argue against such restricted necessitation claims, since we do require grounding as
a deep explanation relation to obligate modal covariance of the relata to some extent.
Third, the intentionalists can deny AIG-1 (Possibly, we intend q to be squishable)
or AIG-2 (Possibly, we intend q to be non-squishable). But AIG-1 and AIG-2 are
unlikely to be false, for there is no reason that we cannot intend q to be whatever we
like; for example, there could not be any natural properties in q that prevent us from
forming different intentions; after all, Lumpl and Goliath have exactly the same
physical features yet the intentionalists think that we can have different intentions
towards them. Also, the fact that we possibly intend q to be squishable/nonsqusihible
should not have any bearing on whether we can possibly intend it to be otherwise,
since our intentions in different possible worlds do not interfere with each other.
Perhaps there are some constraints on what is good for one to intend from the point of
usefulness in social practice, or there may be some limit to what we can intend from
the perspective of our mental mechanisms, but it certainly seems that we have enough
freedom to have intentions as to whether q is squishable or not.
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Finally, the intentionalists may want to deny the S5 principles. I will not give a
full argument against this option due to the limited space of this paper. But I want to
suggest some difficulties of this option to the intentionalists. The denial of S5
principles in modal theories amounts to the denial that all possible worlds are S5structured. But notice that my argument need not rely on this strong modal
assumption, but need only require that there is a restricted set of possible worlds that
are S5-structured. Thus, the intentionalists who take this option must go on to deny
that two conflicting intentions can exist in the same S5-structured set of possible
worlds. But then they have to come up with a story about how a certain intention in
one possible world can determine all our intentions in other possible worlds within the
same restricted set bound by S5. Again, since it is unlikely that our intentions in
different possible worlds can interfere with each other, no such story easily comes to
mind at this point.
Thus, it seems that the intentionalists have no good resource to solve the
contradiction. If they are not prepared to make highly contentious claims about
grounding or modal properties, they had better give up (IG).

3. The Sophisticated Intentionalists’ View
Not surprisingly, intentionalists do give up (IG). In this section, I will examine a
more sophisticated position represented by C.S. Sutton (2012). 15 Sutton rejects (IG)
as inaccurate: (IG) says that we intend Goliath (or Lumpl) to be non-squishable (or
squishable), but that this is not true. We do not direct our intention towards Goliath
and Lumpl as if they existed prior to our intention and we simply bestowed properties

15

There are other intentionalists, who may tell slightly different stories than Sutton. See Amie
Thomasson (2007) and Alan Sidelle (2001). But the difference is not significant as far as my criticism
is concerned. So, while my argument is explicitly directed at Sutton only, it is implicitly addressing a
wider literature, and I would love to see how other intentionalists will respond to my argument.
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on them; rather, there is no Goliath or Lumpl before the exercise of our intention, and
only in virtue of our intention do they come into existence. What, then, is the object of
intention? Sutton argues that it is the parts that later compose Goliath and Lumpl. Let
me make an analogy to illustrate her idea. Imagine an artist creating her artwork: she
makes a pile of bananas, puts some pigs’ brain beside it, and hangs some needles
under the low ceiling; when she finishes, she moves back and looks, then decides that
everything is in the right place, and names the whole thing “xyz”. Sutton’s version of
intention is like this: it is the parts, namely the bananas, the needles, etc. rather than
the “xyz” that the artist adjusts and ponders and judges to be arranged in the right way
so as to compose the new entity. (One little discrepancy between the analogy and the
Goliath/Lumpl case is that in the analogy, the artist is perfectly aware of the plurality
of the parts, while in the Goliath/Lumpl case, we may be only conscious of one
physical thing with a certain shape and weight through which the parts collectively
present themselves. One may feel uncomfortable about the disanalogy, but that point
is not what I want to focus on.)
What is interesting about Sutton’s sophisticated intentionalism is that it gives the
initial impression that it could overcome the AIG argument. Let me illustrate this
impression. One may describe Sutton’s grounding claim as follows:
(RI) Necessarily, for all ys, if we intend those ys to compose a
squishable/non-squishable thing, then such intention grounds that there is an
x such that ys compose x and x is squishable/non-squishable. 16
As formulated, the AIG argument cannot apply to (RI), because suppose we want
to assume this:

16

‘ys’ is a plural variable that refers to multiple things.
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(1) Possibly, we intend the ps to compose a squishable thing.
(2) Possibly, we intend the ps to compose a non-squishable thing.
(RI) does not enable us to infer from (1) and (2) that the ps in both cases compose
the same thing. After all, in the Goliath/Lumpl case, our different intentions towards
the parts might result in two different entities, namely Goliath and Lumpl. In this line
of reasoning, it seems that we can only infer at the end of the argument something like
this:
Possibly, there is an x such that the ps compose x and x is possibly squished
Possibly, there is an x such that the ps compose x and x is not possibly
squished.
But the above inferences are perfectly compatible, since x can take different entities
as its value. So the original AIG argument is not effective.
However, although (RI) seems not to be subject to the AIG argument, it is not the
right way to formulate Sutton’s grounding claim, because it fails to answer the
grounding problem in the first place.
The reason that (RI) fails to answer the grounding problem is this: when we apply
RI to the Goliath case, we cannot get the ideal result that our intention that the parts
compose a non-squishable thing grounds Goliath’s non-squishability, for assigning
the parts to the ys in the grounder does not fix the x in the groundee as Goliath.
Theoretically, we can feed anything into x’s placeholder, such as Jack the Giant killer.
Thus (RI) only grounds that something is squishable/ non-squishable, not, as we
expect, that a particular thing that we want to talk about is squishable/ non-squishable.
To fix x to a particular thing, we should probably include the relation between ys in
the grounder and x. Notice that Sutton does not explicitly state what her solution to
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the grounding problem is, though she claims to solve the grounding problem (she only
comes up with the claim that some ys compose something squishable/non-squishable
in virtue of our intending those ys to compose something squishable/non-squishable);
so, I need to extrapolate her grounding claim on her behalf.
A first attempt to improve (RI) is:
(RI-1) Necessarily, for all x and ys, if we intend those ys to compose x,
which is squishable/non-squishable, then this intention grounds x’s
squishability/non-squishability.
This option is a non-starter, because what is crucial to Sutton’s revised
intentionalism is that she wants to avoid directing an intention towards the particular
thing x, while this formulation is equivalent to our intending ys to be x and intending
x to be squishable/non-squishable. Besides, this formulation has the same result as the
old (IG) when confronting the AIG argument: as far as we can intend x to be
squishable, we are equally entitled to intend ys to compose x that is squishable.
A second attempt to improve (RI) is:
(RI-2) Necessarily, for all x and ys, if those ys compose x and we intend those
ys to compose a squishable/non-squishable thing, then these facts ground x’s
squishability/non-squishability.
This formulation is also inadequate as a grounding claim. When applying (RI-2)
to the Goliath/Lumpl case, we have, on the one hand, Goliath is non-squishable
because we intend the parts to compose something non-squishable, and the parts
compose Goliath; on the other hand, the parts also compose Lumpl and hence Lumpl
also satisfies the same grounding condition as Goliath. Then, according to
Generalizability, Lumpl should also be non-squishable. But Lumpl is squishable, or so
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the intentionalists want to say. Thus, (RI-2) is not an adequate grounding claim.
All the other intentionalists’ grounding claims that similarly rely on stipulating
the parts of a particular thing instead of stipulating the object of intentions will fail to
distinguish between Goliath and Lumpl, since Goliath and Lumpl have the same
parts.
One may be tempted to think that there must be a way to pick out Goliath or
Lumpl uniquely without having intentions directed towards it. Since there are two
components in the grounder, namely the composition part and the intention part, that
one can make use of, one might want to add the following subsidiary condition to the
general grounding claim on behalf of the Suttonian intentionalists: any x (artifacts or
whatever the intentionalists are talking about) just is something composed of some ys
that is squishable/non-squishable. She may even provide a long list in which every
entity is defined uniquely. The list may contain items such as: Goliath = the
composition of the clay parts that is non-squishable; Lumpl = the composition of the
clay parts that is squishable; Clockle = the composition of the clock parts that is nonsquishable; Towelle = the composition of the towel parts that is squishable, etc. Then,
the objector may propose, the intentionalists can solve the indistinguishability
problem that troubles (RI-2) by appealing to the unique definition of Goliath or
Lumpl. Let us use Goliath as an example: since we intend the clay parts to compose
something non-squishable, and since Goliath just is something composed by those
parts that is non-squishable, we have grounded Goliath’s non-squishability. The
general grounding claim would be like this:
(RI-3) Necessarily, for all ys and x, if we intend those ys to compose
something squishable/non-squishable, then this intention, taken together with
the fact that x just is whatever is composed of the ys that is squishable/non-
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squishable, grounds that x is squishable/non-squishable.
Although (RI-3) circumvents the indistinguishability problem, the subsidiary
condition is itself troublesome. To illustrate, there are two possible readings of the
definition that Goliath just is something composed of the clay parts that is nonsquishable. First, it can mean that Goliath is nothing over and above the composition
of the specific parts that is non-squishable. On this reading, the intentionalists would
commit themselves to parthood essentialism, namely that Goliath could not have been
composed of different parts and still have existed. But this is implausible. For
example, Goliath would continue to exist if we were to replace some of its parts.
Second, the subsidiary condition can also mean that whatever is composed of the
parts and is non-squishable is Goliath. On this reading, Goliath could have been
composed of different parts, so we cannot charge the intentionalists with parthood
essentialism. While this statement is unproblematic in the actual world where the
parts do compose Goliath, it nevertheless becomes problematic when we consider all
possible worlds, as is required by (RI-3). In order to answer the grounding problem,
the intentionalists would need to say that whatever could have been composed by the
parts that is non-squishable is Goliath. This is problematic because the parts could
also compose duplicates of Goliath which are non-squishable and yet are not Goliath.
In this case, the intentionalists once again fail to ground that Goliath is nonsquishable.
Therefore, Sutton is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, any grounder that
does not include our intention towards a particular thing fails to pin down the
particular thing in the groundee. On the other hand, she wants to reject the idea that
our intention is directed towards a particular thing, since there is no pre-intention
entity for intention to be directed to. To steer clear of this dilemma, Sutton needs a
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very special kind of intention – a special relation between our intention and a
particular thing – which does not include the particular thing as its object or content,
yet can fix the resulting composite entity to be the particular thing once it is directed
towards the parts. One way to cash out such a special relation is to hold that the
intention is directed in a-particular-thing-like way. In particular, if our intention is
directed in a Goliath-like way to the parts, the parts compose Goliath. Thus, just as I
can happy-in-a-rainday-ly intend my little brother to sing, I can Goliathly intend the
parts to be non-squishable. Accordingly, the grounding claim would be:
(RI-4) Necessarily, for any x and ys, if we intend in an x-like way that ys
compose something squishable/non-squishable, then such intention grounds
x’s squishability/non-squishability.
Here, I confess my ignorance of what such a Goliathly intention would be like.
Fortunately, we need not worry about whether this special kind of intention is really
legitimate, since the AIG argument against (IG), the naive intentionalists’ grounding
claim, also applies against (RI-4):
AIG’-1. Possibly, we intend x-like-ly that ys compose something squishable.
AIG’-2. Possibly, we intend x-like-ly that ys compose something nonsquishable.
…

⊥

Again, to defend (RI-4), Sutton has to deny one of AIG’-1 and AIG’-2; but it
seems that we are as free to x-like-ly intend ys to compose something squishable/nonsquishable as to intend x to be squishable/non-squishable in the naive intentionalists’
story, since there is no natural connection between x and squishability/nonsquishability prior to our intention. If there exists a complicated story that explains
why we cannot freely x-like-ly intend ys to be a certain way, it is at least not obvious
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at the moment.
With all the above considerations, I would like to conclude that Sutton fails to
propose an intentionalists’ grounding claim that is both accurate and capable of
overcoming the AIG argument, hence leaving the grounding problem ultimately
unanswered.

4. Conclusion.
Intentionalists hope to ground persistence conditions and modal properties in
terms of our intentions. The naive version of intentionalism thinks that x’s
squishability/non-squishability is grounded in our intending it to be squishable/nonsquishable, while Sutton’s more sophisticated version takes x’s squishability/nonsquishability to be grounded in our intentions towards its parts. In this paper, I have
proposed that the AIG argument jeopardizes both versions of intentionalism. For the
naive version, when we have possibly different intentions about whether a particular
thing is squishable or non-squishable, given that our intentions towards it necessarily
ground its modal properties, we end up with the fatal contradiction that the particular
thing is both possibly squishable and not possibly squishable. Sutton tries to revise the
naive version, but it is hard to extrapolate her exact grounding claim from her theory.
After examining various possible ways of formulating her grounding claim, I come up
with what proves to be the only sensible way, which is nevertheless subject to the
same argument as the one against the naive intentionalism. Thus, I conclude that both
versions fail to solve the grounding problem.
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Appendix

A Formal proof for the AIG argument:

Dictionary:
ISx: one intends that x is squishable;
INx: one intends that x is non-squishable;
Sx: x is squishable;
Nx: x is non-squishable;
Qx: x is squished.
A≺B: A grounds B.
(a) Justification for AIG-3:

(b) Justification for AIG-4

1. □ (∀x) (ISx→ (ISx ≺ Sx))
(IG)
2. □ (ISq→ (ISq ≺ Sq))
UI 1
3. □ (A→B) → (◊A→◊B)
MO
4. ◊ ISq→ ◊ (ISq ≺ Sq)
MO 2
5. ◊ ISq
AIG-1
6. ◊ (ISq ≺ Sq)
MP 3, 4
7. □ ((ISq ≺ Sq) → □ (ISq→Sq)) Instan. SN
8. ◊ (ISq ≺ Sq) → ◊ □ (ISq→Sq)
MO 7
9. ◊ □ (ISq→Sq)
MP 6, 8
10. 00…□ = □
S5-1
11. □ (ISq→Sq)
S5-1 9
12. ◊ ISq→ ◊ Sq
MO 11
13. ◊ Sq
MP 5, 12

1. □ (∀x) (INx→ (INx ≺ Nx))
(IG)
2. □ (INq→ (INq ≺ Nq))
UI 1
3. □ (A→B) → (◊A→◊B)
MO
4. ◊ INq→ ◊ (INq ≺ Nq)
MO 2
5. ◊ INq
AIG-1
6. ◊ (INq ≺ Nq)
MP 3, 4
7. □((INq ≺ Nq) → □ (INq→Nq)) Insta.SN
8. ◊ (INq ≺ Nq) → ◊ □ (INq→Nq)
MO 7
9. ◊ □ (INq→Nq)
MP 6, 8
10. 00…□ = □
S5-1
11. □ (INq→Nq)
S5-1 9
12. ◊ INq→ ◊ Nq
MO 11
13. ◊ Nq
MP 5, 12

(c) Justification for AIG-5
1. ◊ Nq
2. Nq =df ¬ ◊ Qq
3. ◊ ¬ ◊ Qq
4. ¬ □ ◊ Qq
5. 00…◊ = ◊
6. ¬ ◊ Qq
7. ¬ ◊ ◊ Qq
8. Sq =df ◊ Qq
9. ¬ ◊ Sq

Assp.
Instan. A2
Sub. 1, 2
EQ 3
S5-2
S5-2 4
S5-2 6
Instan. A1
Sub. 7, 8

